Abstract-Topology design is a critical task for the reliability, economic operation, and resilience of distribution systems. This paper proposes a distributionally robust optimization (DRO) model for designing the topology of a new distribution system facing random contingencies (e.g., imposed by natural disasters). The proposed DRO model optimally configures the network topology and integrates distributed generation to effectively meet the loads. Moreover, we take into account the uncertainty of contingency. Using the moment information of distribution line failures, we construct an ambiguity set of the contingency probability distribution, and minimize the expected amount of load shedding with regard to the worst-case distribution within the ambiguity set. As compared with a classical robust optimization model, the DRO model explicitly considers the contingency uncertainty and so provides a less conservative configuration, yielding a better out-of-sample performance. We recast the proposed model to facilitate the column-and-constraint generation algorithm. We demonstrate the out-of-sample performance of the proposed approach in numerical case studies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently U.S. has witnessed repeated severe power outages due to natural disasters such as hurricane Sandy [1] and tropical storm Irene [2] . Only between years of 2003-2012, nearly 679 weather-related power outages happened in the U.S. and each influenced more than 50,000 customers [3] . Unfortunately, the severity and frequency of natural disasters have been trending upwards. For example, in the last ten years, the U.S. has suffered from seven of the ten most costly storms in its history [4] . The growing threat from natural disasters calls for better planning of the power grids to improve system arXiv:1808.09038v1 [math.OC] 27 Aug 2018 resiliency. According to the report [5] by the President's Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Department of Energy, nearly 80-90% of outages in the power system occurs along distribution systems, often leading to interruptions of power supply to end customers. Practically, a distribution system is operated in a radial topology so as to make the design and protection coordination as simple as possible. Despite its simplicity, any contingency in the distribution system can interrupt the continuity of power supply to all customers downstream the on-contingency area.
The distribution network planning is widely investigated in existing literature and broadly categorized in three parts: distribution configuration planning ( [6] , [7] ), distribution reconfiguration and self-healing planning ( [8] , [9] ), and distribution reinforcement and expansion planning ( [10] , [11] ). The main objective of distribution configuration planning is to design a new system to meet the demand in the most cost-effective and reliable way. Distribution reconfiguration and self-healing planning aim at improving or recovering of network functionality by altering the topological structure of the network. In particular, a self-healing process is brought up when a contingency occurs in the system. Distribution reinforcement and expansion planning involve enhancing the resilience of the network to protect against possible damages or expanding current facilities to increase reliability. This paper focuses on the distribution network configuration part. As we borrow some ideas from the self-healing and reinforcement planning literature, we also briefly review the relevant works in these domains.
Existing mathematical models of distribution network configuration involve various design variables that usually include the location [12] and size [13] of equipments like substations and feeders. As the penetration of distributed generation (DG) resources grows, the location and sizing of the DG units has also received increasing attention in the literature (see, e.g., [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] ). The network topology is another important design variable (see, e.g., [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] ). [18] proposes an optimal network topology design that minimizes investment and variable costs associated with power losses and reliability. [19] considers network reconfiguration and maintains a radial network topology by ensuring that the nodeincidence matrix has non-zero determinant. [20] explicitly incorporates the radiality constraints in the distribution system configuration model and considers the integration of DG units. None of the above works incorporate the possibility of contingency occurrences in the planning stage.
Most of existing planning models in the literature incorporate contingencies in a post-outage recovery formulation that identifies an optimal network reconfiguration and promptly restores the system. [8] studies a comprehensive framework for the distribution system in both normal operation and selfhealing modes. In the normal operation mode, the objective is to minimize the operation costs. When a contingency happens, the system enters the self-healing mode by sectionalizing the on-outage zone into a set of self-supplied microgrids (MGs) to pick up the maximum amount of loads. [9] develops a systematic framework including planning and operating stages for a smart distribution system. In the planning stage, the goal is to construct self-sufficient MGs using various DGs and storage units. In the operating stage, a new formulation that incorporates both emergency reactions and system restoration is addressed for carrying out optimal self-healing control actions. [22] proposes a graph-theoretic distribution system restoration algorithm to find an optimal network reconfiguration after multiple contingencies arise in the system, where the MGs are modeled as virtual feeders and the distribution system is modeled as a spanning tree. All of the above works are under the premise that the contingencies have already been located and then we perform system reconfiguration to enhance its reliability. In contrast, this paper considers the stochasticity of the contingency (e.g., caused by natural disasters).
Existing distribution reinforcement planning models consider stochastic contingencies and carry out pre-event enhancement activities including vegetation management, pole refurbishments, and undergrounding of power lines [1] . [10] presents a two-stage robust optimization model for optimally allocating DG resources and hardening lines before the upcoming natural disasters. A new uncertainty set for contingency occurrences is developed to capture the spatial and temporal dynamic of hurricanes. [11] proposes a new tri-level optimization approach to mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events on the distribution system, with the objective of minimizing hardening investment and the worst-case load shedding cost. An infrastructure fragility model is exploited by considering a time-varying uncertainty set of disastrous events. Even though the above works adopt realistic uncertainty sets for modeling the contingency, challenges still exist for the robust optimization approaches. Indeed, they completely neglect the probabilistic characteristics of the contingency. Accordingly, the robust optimization approaches may only focus on the worst-case contingency and yield over-conservative solutions.
To tackle these challenges, distributionally robust (DR) models have been proposed [23] . The DR models consider a set of probability distributions of the uncertain parameters (termed ambiguity set) using certain statistical characteristics (e.g., moments). Then, we search for a solution that is optimal with respect to the worst-case probability distribution within the ambiguity set. DR models have been applied on various power system problems, such as unit commitment [24] , reserve scheduling [25] , congestion management [26] , and transmission expansion planning [27] .
To the best of our knowledge, this paper conducts the first study of DR models for distribution network configuration when facing contingency. Our main contributions include: (a) by incorporating the contingency probability distribution, our DR model is able to capture the contingencies with lower probability but high impacts, two key features of natural disaster-induced outages; (b) we recast the DR model as a two-stage robust optimization formulation that facilitate the column-and-constraint generation algorithm (see Proposition 1); (c) solving the DR model yields a worst-case contingency distribution, which can be used (e.g., in simulation models) to examine other topology configuration/re-configuration policies facing random contingency (see Proposition 2); (d) numerical case studies demonstrate the better out-of-sample performance of our DR model. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the DR formulation including the network configuration, the restoration process, and the ambiguity set of contingency probability distribution. In Section III, we derive an equivalent reformulation and employ the columnand-constraint generation framework to solve the problem. Finally, in Section IV, we conduct case studies and analyze the computational results.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We propose a distributionally robust optimization model for a distribution network facing random contingency. The model involves two stages. In the first stage, we form a set of radially configured networks, each energized by a substation within the network. In addition, we allocate a set of available DGs in the system. Then, the contingency launches a set of disruptions to the system to inflict damages. In the second stage, we take restoration actions to minimize the load shedding by rescheduling the output of substations and DGs.
A. Distribution network configuration
We plan to establish a distribution system in a new community without existing facilities. In this community, only the locations of loads and substations are identified. It is assumed that the substations are connected to a higher-level substation in the grid. Let graph G = (N , E) represent the distribution network, where N denotes the set of nodes and E denotes the set of distribution lines that can be constructed. Also, assume that substations are located in the set R ⊂ N . In the devised network configuration, the distribution system consists of a set of radial networks in the sense that each load bus is connected to a substation directly or via other nodes. In other words, we construct a spanning forest with |R| components, each rooted at one substation. For this purpose, we add a new higher-level node s to graph G and connect it to all substation nodes, i.e., nodes in R. We call the new graph G = (N , E ). Now constructing a spanning forest rooted in R is equivalent to constructing a spanning tree of this new graph G , where all newly added lines (i.e., E \E) are included in the tree (see Fig.   1 for an example). To formulate the spanning tree, we employ the single commodity formulation [28] as follows:
We remark that f mn does not represent the power flow along the line (m, n). Instead, it represents fictitious flow to mathematically guarantee that the distribution network is radial. Constraint (1a) indicates that there must be |N | − 1 arcs leaving the root node s in order to form a spanning tree. Constraints (1b) ensure the connectivity of the spanning tree. Constraint (1c) specifies that, in the constructed spanning tree, the number of connected lines should be one unit less than the number of nodes. Constraints (1d) designate that the capacity of fictitious flow on each line should be no more than the total number of connected lines. Constraints (1e) indicate that all substations should be connected to the higher-level node s. Furthermore, we consider the budget constraints on the number of available DG units for installation and the total construction costs, as stated in (1g) and (1h), respectively:
B. Post-contingency restoration process
In this study, we model the whole restoration process using a number of corrective actions to minimize the load shedding. We adopt the well-studied linearized approximation of the DistFlow model (see, e.g., [10] , [29] ) to formulate power flow in the distribution system after the contingency. According to this model, active and reactive power balance flows at each bus are expressed as follows:
According to the linearized DistFlow model, the relationship of voltage level between any pair of adjacent nodes is characterized by the following constraints:
Moreover, the voltage level at each node should be within a permissible range:
Additionally, if line (m, n) is not constructed in the configuration stage or constructed but disrupted during the contingency, the power flow on line (m, n) should be zero. These restrictions are described by the following constraints:
In our proposed framework, each radial network is rooted at a node where the substation is placed. Moreover, the DG units can supply power not only to their neighboring loads but also to all nodes in the connected network. The active and reactive power capacity of the substations and DGs are described by the following constraints:
Finally, the unsatisfied active demand at each node should be no more than the active demand at that node:
(2k)
C. Ambiguity set of contingency Different approaches have been proposed in the literature to deal with the uncertainty of contingency. Stochastic programming (SP) is well-known for modeling contingency due to natural disasters (see, e.g., [30] , [31] , [32] ). Using statistical methods, SP estimates the joint probability distribution of contingency and then generates a set of scenarios to represent the stochastic contingency in decision making. The major drawback of this approach is that the underlying probability distribution often cannot be estimated accurately, and the computational effort significantly increases as the number of contingency scenarios increases. Robust optimization (RO) is another well-known approach to cope with the uncertainty of contingency (see, e.g., [10] , [11] ). Applied on the distribution network configuration problem, RO identifies the most critical contingencies by solving the following bilevel model:
where,
g := (y, w, f ) indicates network configuration and DG allocation decision variables, u := (p, q, x p , x q , ν, s) denotes the post-contingency decision variables, and Q(g, z) represents the minimum load shedding for given topology g and contingency z. Moreover, D(g) specifies the set of all possible contingency scenarios. We assume by constraints (3b) that the number of simultaneous line outages is bounded by N z , which can be calibrated based on reliability analyses of distribution lines during contingency (see, e.g., [33] ). Constraints (3c) designate that only constructed lines can be affected, i.e., z mn,t is set to be one whenever y mn equals zero. However, variables z mn,t only appear in constraints (2e)-(2f), whose right-hand sides equal zero if y mn = 0, regardless of the value of z mn,t . Hence, we can relax constraints (3c) without loss of optimality. Constraints (3d) model the minimum restoration time of failing distribution lines. As discussed in Section I, the RO model may only focus on the worst-case contingency (i.e., z ∈ D(g) that maximizes Q(g, z) in (3a)) and yield over-conservative topology design and/or DG allocation.
To overcome the challenges of the classical stochastic and robust approaches, we propose a DR framework considering a family of joint probability distributions of contingency based on the moment information of the random parameters (see, e.g., [23] , [24] , [34] ). More specifically, we define the ambiguity set as follows:
where P D(g) consists of all probability distributions on a sigma-field of D(g). Constraints (5) imply that the marginal probability of each line (m, n) not working during time unit t has an upper limit µ max . We note that, although D models the contingency of new distribution lines, the distributional information (e.g., µ max and D(g)) can be calibrated based on reliability analyses of distribution lines (see, e.g., [33] ). Accordingly, we consider the following DR model:
Here, instead of considering the worst-case scenario of contingency as in the RO model, we consider the worst-case distribution of contingency and the corresponding expected load shedding. Hence, our approach, though still risk-averse, is less conservative than the RO approach.
D. Distributionally robust optimization model
Our distributionally robust optimization model aims to find an optimal distribution system configuration to minimize the load shedding under random contingency:
In above formulation, the objective function (7a) aims to minimize the worst-case expected load shedding Q(g, z).
III. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first derive reformulations of the worstcase expectation model (6) and the DR model (7a)-(7b), respectively. Then, we describe a solution approach based on the column-and-constraint generation (CCG) framework. Finally, we derive the worst-case distribution of contingency.
A. Problem reformulation Proposition 1: For fixed g ∈ G, we have
where dual variables β are associated with constraints (5).
The proof is given in the appendix. By Proposition 1 and combining two minimizations, we obtain the following equivalent reformulation of formulation (7a)-(7b):
t∈T n∈N
Therefore, the DR model (7a)- (7b) is transformed into the classical robust optimization problem (8).
B. Column-and-constraint generation framework
We employ the CCG framework [35] to solve the problem (8) . We describe the master problem in the r th iteration of the CCG framework as follows:
where F ⊆ D(g). In the CCG framework, set F is iteratively augmented by incorporating more scenarios. Note that, the master problem is a relaxation of the original problem, in which the set of contingency D(g) consists of all possible scenarios satisfying constraints (3b) (note that, as discussed in Section II-C, we have relaxed (3c) without loss of optimality). Therefore, solving the master problem (9a)-(9c) yields a lower bound for that optimal value of (8). In contrast, the following subproblem yields an upper bound:
where decisionsĝ andβ are obtained from solving the master problem (9a)-(9c). Note that (ĝ,β) is feasible to the problem (8) . Hence, the optimal objective value of (10), plus constant t∈T (m,n)∈E (µ max mn,t − 1)β mn,t , is an upper bound for (8) . Moreover, since the inner minimization problem of (10) is always feasible and bounded (a trivial solution is when all loads are shed), we take the dual of this minimization problem with strong duality and convert the bilevel subproblem (10) into the following single-level bilinear maximization problem:
t∈T (m,n)∈E 
nt are free and other variables are nonpositive, where π represent dual variables pertaining to constraints (2a)-(2k). Note that bilinear terms πz in the objective function (11a) can be linearized using the McCormick method [36] , which recasts the problem (11a)-(11i) as a mixed-integer linear program and facilitates efficient off-the-shelf solvers like CPLEX. The CCG framework is summarized as follows:
Step 0: Initialization. Pick an optimality gap . Set LB = −∞, UB = +∞, set of contingencies F = Ø, and iteration index r = 1.
Step 1: Solve the master problem (9a)-(9c), obtain the optimal value objMP and optimal configuration decisionsĝ r andβ r , and update LB = objMP.
Step 2: Solve the subproblem (11a)-(11i), obtain the optimal value objSP and an optimal contingency scenarioẑ r . Update UB = min{UB, objSP + t∈T (m,n)∈E (µ max mn,t − 1)β mn,t }, and F = F ∪ {ẑ r }.
Step 3: If Gap = (UB − LB)/LB ≤ , then terminate and outputĝ r as an optimal solution; otherwise, update r = r + 1 and go to the next step.
Step
r ∈ H(g,ẑ r ). Add them to the master problem and go to Step 1.
An important by-product of the CCG framework is the worst-case contingency probability distribution, which is formalized in the following proposition. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the CCG framework terminates at the R th iteration with optimal solutions (β R ,ĝ R ,λ R , {û j } j=1,...,R ). Then, if we resolve formulation (9a)-(9c) with variables g and u j fixed atĝ R andû j , respectively, then the dual optimal solutions associated with constraints (9b), denoted as {ψ j } j=1,...,R , characterize the worst-case contingency probability distribution, i.e., P{z = z j } = ψ j , ∀j = 1, . . . , R.
IV. CASE STUDY
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we conduct two case studies. In the first study, the distribution network includes 33 nodes, 3 substations, and 2 DG units for allocation. The 3 substations are located at nodes 1, 11, and 25, respectively. In the second study, the system contains 69 nodes, 4 substations, and 3 DG units for allocation. The substations are located at nodes 1, 13, 39, and 61, respectively. The active and reactive power capacities of the DGs are assumed to be 100KW and 50KVar, respectively. In both studies, we consider 24 hours in the post-contingency restoration, i.e., T = {1, . . . , 24}. The active and reactive power loads at each node are randomly generated from intervals [30, 200] KW and [5, 100]KVars, respectively. The construction costs for distribution lines are randomly generated from intervals proportional to their length. Overall, the construction costs are within the interval $[40, 100]×10
4 . The contingency status for distribution lines is assumed to follow independent Bernoulli distributions with different failure probabilities that vary within the interval [0, 0.01]. Unless stated otherwise, we set the construction budget B y and the maximum number of affected lines N z to be $1770 × 10 4 and 3 for the 33-node system, and $4480 × 10 4 and 4 for the 69-node system, respectively. All case studies are implemented in C++ with CPLEX 12.6 on a computer with Intel Xeon 3.2 GHz and 8 GB memory. 
A. Optimal distribution network configuration
We report optimal configurations for the 33-node and the 69-node distribution systems in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , respectively. We also compare our DR model with the RO model. For comparison purposes, we fix configuration decisions obtained by each model and then simulate the load shedding using randomly generated contingencies. Table I reports the expected load shedding under the worst-case contingency distribution (WCD), the load shedding under the worst-case contingency scenario (WCS), the out-of-sample average load shedding under a randomly simulated contingency distribution within D (Sim), and the computational time of both models. The results verify that our DR approach yields lower load shedding both under worst-case distribution and in the out-of-sample simulations. In particular, our approach leads to 11% and 10% reduction in average load shedding in the out-of-sample simulation and 13% and 5% reduction under the worstcase distribution for the 33-node and 69-node distribution systems, respectively. For the worst-case contingency scenario, RO model triggers less load shedding, which was expected, because RO optimizes the system configuration with respect to the worst-case contingency scenario. In addition, the CPU seconds taken to solve the test instances demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed solution approach. To further verify the efficacy, we replicate the experiments on 10 randomly generated instances. For the 33-node system, the average and maximum number of iterations the CCG algorithm takes to converge are 7.6 and 12, respectively; and for the 69-node system, the average and maximum number of iterations are 8.4 and 14, respectively.
B. On the value of optimal DG allocation
We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the value of optimally allocating DG units in the distribution system. In Fig. 5 we compare the level of load shedding when DG units are optimally located with the case when DG units are randomly deployed. For "optimal DG", we solve the DR and RO models. For "random DG", we first randomly place DGs and then solve both models to configure the distribution system. We perform the experiments for 5 times and report the average values to mitigate the randomness. From Figs. 4 and 5, we observe that locating DGs properly can significantly decrease the load shedding. This is because when the distribution system is affected by contingencies, the loads in islanded zones can be effectively picked up by the existing DG resources. As a result, better DG allocation significantly enhances the system resiliency. In Figs. 6 and 7, we depict the amounts of expected load shedding under various line construction budgets (i.e., B y ) and contingency budgets (i.e., N z ). From these two figures, we observe that load shedding reduces as B y increases and as N z decreases, i.e., as we allow the contingency to affect less power lines in the DR model. This is intuitive. In addition, we observe that load shedding is sensitive to the construction budget. For example, by increasing the budget from $4440×10 4 to $4480×10 4 when N z = 4 in Fig. 7 , the load shedding decreases from 5485KW to 4297KW, which means that a 0.9% budgetary rise translates into a 21.6% load shedding reduction. Furthermore, we observe that the impact of construction budget is marginally diminishing. For example, increasing the budget from $4500×10 4 to $4560×10 4 (i.e., by 1.3%) results in a 6.7% load shedding reduction. This observation highlights the necessity of implementing a costeffective distribution configuration planning.
D. Worst-case contingency distribution
The worst-case contingency distribution for the 69-node distribution system is reported in Table II . We select a subset of representative scenarios to display and omit other scenarios with smaller probability values. From this table, we observe that the contingency probabilities for different power lines are highly heterogeneous. This provides the system operator a guideline on the system vulnerability and a meaningful contingency probability distribution that can be used in other vulnerability analyses. 
s.t. (1 − z mn,t )dP ≤ µ max mn,t , ∀(m, n) ∈ E, ∀t ∈ T . (12c)
The feasible region of the problem (12a)-(12c) has an interior point. In other words, there exists aP that satisfies constraint (12b) at equality and constraint (12c) strictly. For example, we can setP to be the probability distribution solely supported on the scenario that no contingency arises in the system, i.e., z mn,t = 1, ∀(m, n) ∈ E, t ∈ T . Thus, the Slater's condition holds between the problem (12a)-(12c) and the following dual formulation:
t∈T (m,n)∈E µ max mn,t β mn,t ,
s.t. γ + t∈T (m,n)∈E
(1 − z mn,t )β mn,t ≥ Q(g, z), ∀z ∈ D(g). (14) where γ and β are dual variables associated with constraints (12b) and (12c), respectively. In the dual formulation, we observe that the optimal γ should satisfy 
By constraints (16b)-(16c), {ψ j } j=1,...,R characterize a probability distribution supported on scenarios {z j } j=1,...,R such that P{z = z j } = ψ j , ∀j = 1, . . . , R. As the CCG framework terminates at the R th iteration and by the strong duality of linear programming, formulation (16a)-(16c) is equivalent to the worst-case expectation formulation (6), i.e., these two formulations yield the same optimal value. It follows that {ψ j } j=1,...,R characterize the worst-case contingency probability distribution.
